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VIRTUAL ESPIONAGE: SPYWARE AND THE COMMON
LAW PRIVACY TORTS
Don Corbettt
INTRODUCTION
Like any working mother with children, time always seemed to
be an obstacle for Danielle. I Her schedule seemed endlessly
divided between preparing presentations at work, fixing breakfast,
lunch, or dinner, and running between activities for the kids. She
had never been computer savvy, but by helping her children
complete some homework assignments, Danielle was introduced to
the wonders of the Internet. She realized she could use her home
computer to pay her bills, shop, read various newspapers, and keep
up with her favorite television shows more quickly and easily than
ever before.
After several months of heavy Internet usage, Danielle noticed
her computer was not operating as quickly as it had in the past.
She also saw a large increase in the number of advertisements that
appeared on her screen as she tried to either read material or pay
her bills. On two occasions, when Danielle connected to the
Internet, she found her home page had been changed. She thought
these incidents were slightly peculiar, but paid them little attention
since she did not know much about computers. The Internet still
seemed like a godsend.
One day, Danielle went online to pay another bill and was
shocked to see her account showing a zero balance. Since she had
just gotten paid the previous week, she knew this was inaccurate.
Moreover, when she looked at a more detailed version of her
transactions, she noticed a number of sizable purchases charged to
her account that she did not recognize. Horrified, Danielle called
the bank and was notified that not only were all the purchases
made in the last week, but also several even larger purchases were
standing by waiting to be cleared by the bank. Danielle informed
the bank that she had no idea how the purchases happened because
t
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no other person possessed her account information and she had
never made them. When she told bank representatives about her
online activity, they infonned her that due to possible infiltration
of her computer, she might not be the only one with access to her
account.
Danielle called a computer repair company. After a thorough
inspection, the company's employees informed Danielle she had
several dozen software applications commonly known as
"spyware" loaded on to her computer. The spyware enabled
someone in cyberspace to watch every move Danielle made on her
computer. The computer repair employees told her that one or
more of these spyware programs had likely gathered her bank
account information and shared it with a third party, paving the
way for the unauthorized purchases.
Like Danielle, thousands of other computer owners are unaware
of the perils of spyware, a form of advertising-supported software.
The term "spyware" is Internet slang that describes technology
which "takes up residence" on a personal computer, usually
without the owner's knowledge or consent. 2 Its purpose is to
gather information about "the activities and preferences of the
computer's users," and to retrieve data stored on a computer so it
can be forwarded to a third party. 3 While some of these programs
are fairly harmless, other more nefarious spyware programs can
lead to problems ranging from those suffered by Danielle all the
way to the theft of one's identity.
If Danielle is lucky, she will recover the majority of her money
lost based on unauthorized purchases. 4 Still, the monitoring of
one's computer use can result in not just financial harm. It can
also produce a significant breach of another important, but less
tangible interest-the person's right to privacy. 5 One of the
fundamental principles related to our general understanding of
what constitutes privacy is a person's ability to retreat to a space
where he or she cannot be troubled, interrupted, or viewed by the
2.
3.
4.

5.

ED TITTEL, PC MAGAZINE FIGHTING SPYWARE, VIRUSES, AND MALWARE 6 (2005).
Id. at 6-7.
The Federal Fair Credit Billing Act allows parties to contest charges for
purchases that account holders did not receive or accept. See 15 U.S.c. § 1666
(2000). The Act requires that the creditor either clarify the charge or "make
appropriate corrections in the account of the obligor," id. at § 1666(a)(B), but the
creditor who fails to do so only forfeits a maximum of $50.00. Id. at § 1666(e).
Also, the Act is limited to "billing errors." See id. at § 1666. This does include a
variety of activities, such as mathematical problems or a failure to properly credit
an account for returned merchandise. Id. at § 1666(b)(4)-(5). For a good
summary of the Federal Fair Credit Billing Act, see Credit Cards: What's Wrong
With
This
Bill?,
CONSUMERREpORTS,
Feb.
2004,
http://www.consumerreports.orglcro/personal-finance/creditcard-billing-errors204/0verview/index.htm.
See infra Part II.
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outside world. 6 However, as our dependence on computer
technology and our Internet usage become more extensive, it is
also clear that our sense of personal privacy is potentially under
attack in novel ways.
This Article will discuss whether the common law torts that
protect one's privacy rights-intrusion upon one's seclusion,
public disclosure of private facts, appropriation of one's likeness,
and placing a party in an objectionable false light in the public
eye-can properly and effectively combat the new privacy threats
potentially caused by advertising-supported software. 7 Part I
chronicles the rise of spyware as a problem, focusing particular
attention on how it works and how it potentially endangers people
like Danielle. Part II will discuss the evolution of the torts that
comprise the rights of action protecting a plaintiff's privacy
interests. Part III will analyze the applicability of these torts to the
possible privacy hazards associated with advertising-supported
software. The Article concludes with the premise that under some
circumstances, courts can and should recognize spyware-related
incidents as actionable invasions of privacy for plaintiffs.
PART I
American dependence on technology extends to our daily lives
in ways that could not have been imagined thirty years ago. 8 For
many of us, as we head to work, we cannot do so without our
Blackberries or tablet computers. 9 When we leave work for home,
we make a direct path to the Xbox, iPod, or TiVo. IO We can no
longer envision our lives without cell phones or home computers. II
Our technological addictions have created a new type of arms race
that now allows people to store, transmit, and access more
information in more ways than at any other time in human history.
But for every electronic advance, there is collateral risk. Our
dependence is not lost on those who wish to profit from our
reliance. Third-parties, like advertisers, marketing professionals,
and hackers, have also benefited from the recent technology
boom. 12 The more we use personal computers, the more "they"

6.

7.
8.

9.
10.
II.
12.

KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 262 (2d ed.
2002).
See infra Parts II(A), II(C) & III.
See Associated Press, Poll Finds Americans Dependent on Tech Gadgets, USA
TODAY, Dec. 21, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.comltechlnews/200512-21-techpoll_x.htm?POE=click-refer.
.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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can see US. 13 By using the science available to track Internet
activity, often via spyware or adware, these third-parties can
personalize their marketing in a way that other traditional
advertising media cannot. 14 While much of the marketing use of
spyware can be relatively harmless,15 computer hackers can also
use this technology for malevolent purposes. 16 Each time a
computer user clicks on an unsolicited Web site or advertisement,
he or she potentially creates an avenue for spyware to infect one's
system. 17
A.

Advertising and the Internet

While not all can afford the latest scientific wizardry, most
people can place much of the world at their fingertips via the
Internet, a global, interconnected network of com~uters that
provides a pathway to information of any and all types. 8 From its
humble origins as a small collection of computer networks used by
the Department of Defense for military communications,19 the
Internet now allows users to easily find and use data regarding
virtually any subject from any part of the world. 2o The term
"Internet" is often inaccurately used interchangeably with the term
"World Wide Web.,,21 The Internet refers to the technology that
enables information to be retrieved online through computers,
servers, and cables, while the Web is the compilation of text,
audio, and photographs that can be accessed via the Internet. 22
Semantics aside, people like Danielle now use the Internet and the
World Wide Web to shop, do all of their banking, and keep up
with current events. The Pew Internet and American Life Project
estimated that on an average day in 2005, 94 million Americans

13.
14.

15.
16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
See PCmag.com, Definition of: Spyware,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_termlO.2542.+=spyware&i=51898,00.asp
(last visited Dec. 30, 2006).
See What is Spyware?, http://www.spywaredetectiontips.com (last visited Dec.
30,2006).
Top Ways a Hacker Can Get Into Your Computer,
http://www.winferno.com/guides/articles/block-spam-block-popups-blockhackers.asp (last visited Dec. 30, 2006).
See Spyware, http://onguardonline.gov/spyware.html(last visited Dec. 30,2006).
The Internet has been defined in many ways. This is only one example. See In re
Doubleclick, Inc., Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497,501 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Id.
HARLEY HAHN & RICK STOUT, THE INTERNET COMPLETE REFERENCE 497 (1994).
In re Daub/eclick, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d at 501.
See id.
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used the Internet. 23 It is also estimated that in 2006, approximately
1.043 billion people across the planet will access the Internet. 24
As it became evident that increasing numbers of people were
spending larger amounts of time on the Web, advertisers began to
direct more resources toward Internet marketing. 25 This online
advertising comes in several models. 26 "Banner" advertisements
are bars that resemble billboards that either run across the top of
the Web page or down one of its sides. 27 Then, there are 'Fop-up"
advertisements, which are separate advertising windows. 2 When
users click on the advertisement, they are then connected to the
advertiser's Web page. 29 While banner advertisements do not
necessarily interfere with the user's ability to read the substantive
content of the Web site, pop-up ads jump to the top of the screen
and require the user to close them in order to continue working on
whatever is beneath the ad. 3o Many advertisements also now use
real-time videos on the Web to display their wares, giving them
more of a look and feel of traditional television commercials. 31
When Web browsers began to develop programs that allowed
users to block pop-up ads, software developers created "popunder" ads, which ap~ear behind the page the user views as
opposed to on top of it. 2 Yet another form is the "floater," which
uses a Macromedia Flash program to display the ad in front of the
user's screen for as long as 30 seconds before the desired Web
page is finally accessible. 33 Floater ads do not create a separate
window like pop-up ads, so although they do have "close" options
on them, they still obscure the entire page beneath them. 34
23.

24.
25.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

31.

32.
33.
34.

Daily Internet Activities,
http://www.pewinternet.org/trends/Daily_Activities_12.05 .05.htrn (last visited
Dec. 30, 2006).
World Internet Usage and Population Statistics (June 30, 2006),
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm.
Interactive Advertising Bureau, Internet Advertising Revenues Close to $4
Billion for Ql 2006 (May 30, 2006),
http://www.iab.net/news/pr_2006_05_30.asp.
See TITTEL, supra note 2, at 12-15.
ld. at 12.
/d.
What is Spyware?, supra note 15.
TITTEL, supra note 2, at 12. Pop-up ads tend to be favored by marketers because
it is more likely that web visitors will click on them as opposed to banner
advertisements. See Ronald R. Urbach & Gary A. Kibei, AdwarelSpyware: An
Update Regarding Pending Litigation and Legislation, 16 INTELL. PROP. & TECH.
LJ.7, 12 (2004), available at http://www.dglaw.com/images/ITjournal.pdf.
See
Hyun
Ju
Jeong,
Development
of
InternetlWWW
Ad,
http://www.ciadvertising.org/SAIfall_02/adv391k/jeong/page4_2.html(last
visited Dec. 30, 2006).
Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Pop-Up Ads Shed Blocks. Tackle Consumers, WASH.
POST, June 26, 2005, at F5.
/d.
/d.
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While traditional advertising used polling and research to best
predict what viewers might read or see, online advertisers are now
able to accomplish the same goal by using technology to track the
habits of users. For example, when users visit certain Web pages,
the site may place textual records called "cookies" on the hard
drive. 35 These very small text files record information like user
names, passwords, or account numbers, so the user does not have
to enter the same information every time they access that particular
site. 36 Cookies are also capable of tracking the user's movements
on the Web, allowing those who receive the information to
calculate what type of advertising that particular user may find
attractive so they can send users targeted advertisements in the
future. 37 Cookies are fairly harmless because they often are easy
to block by privacy controls that exist on most Web browsers. 38
They are also easily removed by any number of "anti-spyware
programs. ,,39
B.

Defining and Understanding Spyware

Spyware tends to be difficult to precisely characterize because it
can encompass anything that resides on your computer that has the
ability to report on the preferences and activities of the user once it
is installed. 40 Spyware is regularly grouped with another term
called "adware," but although the two terms share certain traits,
they are not identica1. 41 Adware is designed to display advertising
on your computer while it is running,42 and is generally attached to
larger software applications like music file-sharing programs,
which typically come at no financial cost to the user. 43 Many of
these free software applications contain end-user licensing
agreements. These agreements, in very cumbersome language,
inform the user that certain other programs may be attached to the
free application the user is downloading.44 Upon downloading the
program, users may unknowingly attach adware to their systems,
which collects the data of the Web sites the users visit, and enables
advertisers to target future ads toward particular users.45
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

67 AM. JUR. 3D Proof ofFacts 249 § 1 (2002) [hereinafter Proof ofFacts].
/d.

Id.
TITTEL, supra note 2, at 8.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Compare id. at 7 with id. at 10. Contra Urbach & KibeI, supra note 30, at 12.
TIITEL, supra note 2, at 10.
Robert Vamosi, How to Protect Yourself from Snooping Spyware (Feb. 17,
2003). http://reviews-zdnet.com.coml4520-7297_l6-4207864.htm1.
This is a common tactic in peer-to-peer file sharing programs, such as popular
music download sites like KaZaa. See Urbach & KibeI, supra note 30, at 12.
/d.
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Similarly, users often inadvertently download spyware
applications by simply clicking on pop-up advertisements,46
visiting certain Web sites, or opening unsolicited electronic-mail
messages. 47 But, the installation comes without the user's consent
because the spyware programs do not provide the same notice that
the end-user licensing agreement does. 48 While some precautions
can be taken to guard against spyware infecting one's computer,
inexperienced parties like Danielle often do not protect themselves
against these software programs because they are unaware of their
existence until it is too late. Moreover, spyware has proven to be
flexible, versatile, and resourceful. Once it is on your computer, it
is notoriously difficult to uninstall or delete. 49
The danger of spyware fluctuates according to the type of
tracking device in the software. Some forms are merely designed
to watch your Web activity and track the sites you visit,50 much
like cookies. There is also the Browser Highjacking Object
(BHO), which is designed to take over the user's Internet
browser. 51 The BHO can reset the user's home page to the
vendor's Web page or even alter the results one sees when
conducting searches 52 through more traditional engines like
Google. 53
One of the most hazardous forms of spyware is the "keystroke
logger." It can come in the form of a battery-sized plug that is
physically inserted into the computer, or it can be downloaded on
to your system as software. 54 It has the ability to record keystrokes
that it saves as text on its own hard drive, allowing the party who
installed it to collect the information by physically removing it or
reading the data when it is uploaded periodically over the
Internet. 55 The key logger tool provides some beneficial uses,
such as allowing parents to monitor the Internet activity of their
children, but it can also be used to access sensitive personal
46.
47.
48.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

54.
55.

Generally, the underlying Web site has no relationship with either the pop-up
provider or the advertiser. See id.
Brad Slutsky & Shelia Baran, Just a Tad Intrusive? Spyware and the Internet,
Bus. L. TODAY, Dec. 14,2004, at 33.
Id. at 34.
[d. at 33.
Proof of Facts, supra note 35, at 249 § I.
Slutsky & Baran, supra note 47, at 33.
Id.
Google is an Internet search engine owned by Google, Inc., which allows users to
search for Web pages, videos, or other images. See generally Goog\e,
http://www.google.com (last visited Dec. 30, 2006). Google is the largest search
engine on the Internet, and receives an estimated 200 million queries per day.
See Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Is Google God?, NY TIMES (June 29, 2003),
available at http://www.cnn.coml2003/US/06/29/nyt.friedmanl.
See What is a Keylogger? (June 8, 2005),
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.comlsDefinitionlO,,sid 14~ci962518,00.html.
Id.
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information, such as Social Security numbers, e-mail passwords,
bank account transactions, or credit card numbers. 56 Criminal use
of programs like the keystroke logger has led to a sharp rise in
consumer complaints of Internet-related fraud and identity theft. 57
In 2004, the federal government estimated total losses related to
identity theft and credit card fraud at $52.6 billion to individuals
and businesses. 58
The arrangement between those who provide spyware or
adware and Web site operators is mutually advantageous. Web
site operators receive much-needed revenue by selling advertising
to those who are interested, which offsets the costs associated with
product development. 59 Conversely, while advertisers may not
know for certain if their· television commercials or print
advertisements are being seen by their target audience, pop-up ads,
pop-under ads, and floaters ensure that their ad displays are at least
being seen by their· audiences, even if not every user clicks on the
advertisement. 60 While marketers may have been initially slow to
realize the potential of the Internet, this is no longer the case. 61 In
the third quarter of 2005, Internet advertising revenues reached a
56.

57.

58.
59.

60.
61.

Slutsky & Baran, supra note 47, at 33. For example, Specter Pro, which
describes itself as "the world's best selling software for monitoring and recording
every detail of PC and Internet activity," enables those who purchase it to use its
key logger to document every key typed on the keyboards of their personal
computers.
SpectorSoft,
http://www.spectorsoft.comlproducts/SpectorPro_Windows/entry .asp?refer=6940
(last visited Dec. 30, 2006). It is designed to intercept alphanumeric keystrokes
and hidden characters, like the shift and control key. Id. It allows users to also
record instant messages, all electronic mail (both sent and received), Web sites
visited, and keystrokes entered, and it offers keyword detection and Internet
access blocking. Id. It retails anywhere from $99.95 to $149.95. Id.
See FIN. CRIMES SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT TO
THE PUBLIC § El (2005), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/financiallfcs_report052005/fcs_report052005.
pdf.
Id.
See TiTTEL, supra note 2, at 4.
See Urbach & Kibei, supra note 30, at 12.
This trend can be seen in the growth of the Claria Corporation, a California-based
company that specializes in online marketing.
Claria Corporation,
http://www.hoovers.comlclarial--ID_1 06214--/free-co-factsheet.xhtml
(last
visited Dec. 30, 2006). Founded in 1998, Claria, formerly known as the Gator
Corporation, used to serve targeted advertisements to forty million computer
users through its network. Id. Claria-Cornpany Information-Corporate
Overview, http://www.claria.comlcornpanyinfo/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2006).
Claria used to broadcast its advertisement messages through software
applications that tracked the users' online behavior, often doing so as a part of
free software packages. Claria Corporation, http://www.hoovers.comlclaria/-ID_I06214--/free-co-factsheet.xhtml (last visited Dec. 30, 2006). In 2003, it
generated $90.5 million in sales, a one-year increase of 122.9% over the previous
year. Claria Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Apr. 8, 2004), available
at http://knobias.IOkwizard.comlfiling.php?repo=tenk&doc= l&ipage=2723312.
Claria's net income for 2003 was $34.9 million, a one-year growth rate of
38,203%. Id.
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record $3.1 billion, the highest quarter reported and a 33.9 percent
increase over the previous year. 62 The estimated annual Internet
advertising revenue projection for 2005 was $12 billion, a nearly
$3 billion increase over 2004. 63 It is precisely this desire to move
product that is, at a minimum, causally connected to some of the
injuries caused by spyware.
The prevalence of spyware and adware is far from isolated. In
October 2004, America Online and the National Cyber Security
Alliance conducted a study involving 329 randomly selected
personal computers. 64 The study found that 80 percent of the
computers contained some form of spyware. 65 The average
"infected" computer had 93 spyware or adware programs,
providing a small snapshot of the risk to the average user.66 In
response, several anti-spyware bills have been introduced in both
the United States House of Representatives and the Senate,67 but
none have yet gained the traction necessary for passage in both
bodies. 68 The Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass
Act (Spy ACT), sponsored by Representative Mary Bono (RCalif.), was backed by the Energy and Commerce Committee in
March 2005. 69 The SPY ACT precludes any person who is not an
authorized user or owner of a protected computer from engaging in
any deceptive act categorized as taking control of the computer,70
modifying settings related to use of the computer or to the

62.

63.
64.

65.
66.
67.

68.

69.
70.

Press Release, The Interactive Advertising Bureau, Internet Advertising
Revenues
Surpass
$3
Billion
for
Q3
(Nov.
21,
2005),
http://www.iab.net/news/pr_2005_11_21.asp.
Id.
Press Release, National Cyber Security Alliance, Largest In-Home Study of
Home Computer Users Shows Major Online Threats, Perception Gap (Oct. 25,
2004),
available
at
http://www.staysafeonline.info/pdfINCSA-AOLInHomeStudyRelease.pdf.
[d. at 2.
One computer in the study contained 1,059 spyware or adware programs. Id. at
2.
There are already a number of federal laws aimed at protecting privacy rights of
individuals.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, for example,
precludes the interception or disclosure of the contents of any electronic
communication, ranging from electronic mail to telephone conversations, but it is
riddled with exceptions and does not appear applicable to spyware. See 18
U.S.c. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
These include Software Principles Yielding Better Levels of Consumer
Knowledge (SPY BLOCK) Act, S. 687, 109th Congo (2005), Securely Protect
Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act (SPY ACT), H.R. 29, 109th Congo (2005),
and Internet Spyware Prevention (I-SPY) Act of 2004, H.R. 4661, 108th Congo
(2004). Utah and California are the only states to date that have enacted antispyware legislation. See CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22947-22947.6 (West
Supp. 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-40-101 to-401 (2005).
David McGuire, Congress Moving to Tackle Spyware Problem, WASH. POST,
Apr. 15, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dynlA55744-2005Aprl5.
See H.R. 29, § 2(a)(1).
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computer's ability to access or use the Internet,71 or collecting
personally identifiable information through the use of a keystroke
logger. 72 The Spy Aci prohibits several other activities as well,
but part of the problem with any state or federal legislation is that
it runs the risk of being overinclusive. Because spyware has been
difficult to label, any number of legitimate advertising Web
features could be rendered inoperable by statutory language that is
too broad or sweeping. 73 While the SPY ACT does allow for hefty
fines for any company that engages in a pattern and practice of
spyware-related activity,74 such legislation would no doubt be
vigorously contested by those with lawful marketing and
advertising interests.
In summary, it is clear that now more than ever, unassuming
consumers are at greater risk for divulging private information.
The proliferation of spyware and adware is evidence that the
information available online is worth large amounts of money to
those who obtain it, whether they are selling information to another
party, using that information for marketing purposes, or getting it
to pilfer funds or make purchases from the personal accounts of
others. 75 This points to only one conclusion: If you use your PC
to go online, there is an excellent chance someone is monitoring
you without your consent.
PART II
Of all the things most Americans do on a daily basis, few joys
rival that of returning to our homes at the end of the day. Being
able to shut the door on the rest of the world and retreat to our own
space is often the chief incentive for working our way through the
rigors of work, school, or in some cases, socializing. But what is it
about our privacy that we cherish so much? Clearly, the
independence involved with being able to choose your own path of
movement presents one rationale. 76 The freedom to select when
you want to engage in discussion and when you wish to retreat
from such provides us with needed self-autonomy and
empowerment in ways that the bulk of our daily activities do not

71.
72.
73.
74.

75.
76.

See id. § 2(a)(2).
See id. § 2(a)(3).
See McGuire, supra note 69.
See H.R. 29, § 4(b)(I)(A) (stating that the proposed fine to be paid to the Federal
Trade Commission for repeated violations of deceptive acts or practices relating
to spyware is $3 million).
See TITTEL, supra note 2, at 4.
See Matthew W. Finkin, Life Away from Work, 66 LA. L. REv. 945, 952-54
(2006); Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1335,
1374 (1992); June Mary Z. Makdisi, Genetic Privacy: New Intrusion a New
Tort?, 34 CREIGHTON L. REv. 965, 987-90 (2001).
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allow.77 Much of the disparate range of human natural emotion, be
it pleasure, sadness, grief, or anger, would be stifled considerably
if people could not express such feelings behind closed doors,
leading one to conclude that our right to be left alone is essential to
our personal and emotional development. 78
Although the law was slightly delinquent in recognizing the
high societal value in maintaining one's right to be left alone, the
limits and threshold of our right to privacy-tortious,
constitutional, or otherwise-have engendered considerable
debate. 79 As we head further into an information age that is sure to
see the reach of technology's tentacles extend to more areas oflife,
it will get increasingly difficult to retreat without someone having
access to one's person. Spyware is only one small element in this
equation, but in many ways, it is a microcosm of the larger tension
between the present-day societal interest in data collection and the
individual's right to withdraw from the world when he or she
chooses to do so.

A.

Privacy: A Brief Background

Before pinpointing some of the particulars of the tort of
invasion of privacy, the wide spectrum and scope of what
constitutes privacy in the United States 80 merits a brief background
discussion. Though a uniform definition of privacy is somewhat
elusive,81 both the federal and state branches of the American
judicial and legislative wings of government have consistently
attempted to protect the right of individuals and groups82 to have
77.
78.
79.
80.

81.

82.

Finkin, supra note 76, at 952-54; Gonnley, supra note 76, at 1374; Makdisi,
supra note 76, at 987-90.
Finkin, supra note 76, at 952-54; Gonnley, supra note 76, at 1374; Makdisi,
supra note 76, at 987-90.
Gonnley, supra note 76, at 1339-40.
Although much of tort law in the United States has its roots in old English
jurisprudence, the right to privacy is largely an American concept. Great Britain
itself never fonnally recognized a right to privacy until it enacted the Human
Rights Act of 1998. Kathryn F. Deringer, Comment, Privacy and the Press: The
Convergence of British and French Law in Accordance with the European
Convention of Human Rights, 22 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 191, 198 (2003). It later
adopted the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. Id. Prior to that time, however, Parliament rebuffed
attempts to enact legislation related to privacy rights. Id. This changed shortly
after the death of Princess Diana. Id.; see also Kaye v. Robertson, [1991] F.S.R.
62, 70 (C.A.) (U.K.) (stating that only Parliament can recognize right of privacy).
Webster's Dictionary defines privacy as: "\. the state of being private; retirement
or seclusion. 2. freedom from the intrusion of others in one's private life or
affairs: the right to privacy. 3. secrecy." RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 979 (2d ed. 2001).
While the vast majority of privacy cases involve individuals, the U.S.
Constitution guarantees both freedom of religion and freedom of association,
which are more likely to affect groups of people. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The
word "privacy," however, makes no appearance in the Constitution.
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their own autonomy, freely express themselves, and retreat from
society, if and when necessary.83 Additionally, an individual's
right to privacy is, to some degree, protected by cultural, social,
and ethical norms as well. 84
To the extent that it can be categorized, Professor Anita AllenCastellitto and other scholars have succinctly divided United States
privacy law into four distinct classifications:
informational
privacy, physical privacy, proprietary privacy, and decisional
privacy. 85 Informational privacy protects a person's right to
preclude others from either gaining access to, or publishing
information that that person would consider private or
confidential. 86 Plaintiffs have successfully argued that disclosure
of medical records 87 and other confidential matters 88 violated their
right to keep personal information from being disclosed to the
public. Physical privacy rights safeguard a person's interest in his
or her own bodily autonomy and emotional tranquility.89 Physical
privacy cases cast a wide net across areas ranging from
constitutional issues, such as a party's Fourth Amendment
protection from illegal searches and seizures by the government 90
to improper "viewing intrusions.,,91 The home is often the
benchmark of a person's physical privacy rights. 92 Proprietary
privacy rights shield our interest in keeping others from exploiting
our likeness 93 for monetary gain or other business purposes. 94
83.
84.

See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
See Anita L. Allen-Castellitto, The Origins and Growth of u.s. Privacy Law, in
FIRST ANNUAL INST. ON PRIVACY LAW, STRATEGIES FOR LEGAL COMPLIANCE IN A
HIGH TECH AND CHANGING REGULATORY ENV'T, at 11, 13 (PU Intellectual Prop.,
Course Handbook Series No. G-607, 2000).

85.

[d.

86.
87.

See id. at 19 tbl. 1.
See, e.g., Pachowitz v. Ledoux, 2003 WI App. 120, ~ 24, 265 Wis. 2d 631, ~ 24,
666 N.W.2d 88, ~ 24 (finding that disclosure of plaintiff's private medical
records by emergency medical technician to one person constituted invasion of
privacy under state law).
See, e.g., Urbaniak v. Newton, 277 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360 (1991) (finding that
defendant's disclosure of plaintiff's human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) status
violated plaintiff's privacy rights when plaintiff only revealed information to
protect other health care workers who may come into contact with him).
See Allen-Castellitto, supra note 84, at 19 tbl. l.
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that citizens
have reasonable and legitimate expectations of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment, even in areas as small as a public phone booth).
See, e.g., Speer v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 68 Ohio Misc. 2d 13, 15, 646
N.E.2d 273, 274 (Ohio Ct. CI. 1994) (holding that the defendant violated the
plaintiff'S privacy rights by using electronic surveillance devices in the bathroom
where she worked); see also John A. Robertson, Privacy Issues in Second Stage
Genomics, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 59, 62 (1999).
See Allen-Castellitto, supra note 84, at 19 tbl. I.
See, e.g., Minnifield v. Ashcraft, 903 So. 2d 818, 827 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004)
(holding that defendant's publication of photographs of plaintiff's tattoos
constituted a potential invasion of plaintiff's privacy).
See Allen-Castellitto, supra note 84, at 19 tbl. l.

88.

89.
90.

9l.

92.
93.

94.
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Decisional privacy protects one's right to make ~ersonal choices
free from government interference or restriction. 5 This type of
privacy has proven to be a lightning rod for controversy due to the
complex social overtones associated with protections concerning
and
one's
abortion,96
contraception,97
homosexual ity, 98
"constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition.,,99 Privacy rights are not absolute and frequently must be
weighed against other interests that may be at stake during
litigation. Still, because of their essential underlying principles of
self-autonomy, acceptance, and independence, privacy rights are
exceedingly important to most Americans. 100
The development and evolution of the four branches that
currently comprise the tort of invasion of ~rivacy probably can be
traced to a pair of law review articles: 1 1 Louis Brandeis and
Samuel Warren's article, The Right to Privacy, which was
published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890,102 and Dean
William Prosser's article Privacy, which was published seventy
years later in the University of California Law Review. 103 Since
then, the origins and development of the right to privacy have been
among the most discussed topics in American jurisprudence. 104
B.

Warren and Brandeis: The Inspiration

Legend has it that around 1890, Samuel Warren, who graduated
at the top of his class at Harvard Law School but had ceased
practicing law, became exasperated at the Boston press for its

95.
96.

97.

98.

99.

100.
IOI.
102.
103.
104.

See id.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment supersedes laws that criminalize
abortion).
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that fundamental
rights to marital privacy exist with the "penumbra" of liberties within the
Constitution's Bill of Rights and thereby prohibit any legislation that attempts to
criminalize contraception).
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute
prohibiting intimate acts between members of the same sex is unconstitutional
due to infringement upon liberty interests provided by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (recognizing
Fourteenth Amendment protection of a competent person's right to refuse further
medical treatment).
See Allen-Castellitto, supra note 84, at 13.
VICTOR SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 939-40 (I I th ed. 2005).
Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
See, e.g., Joshua Herman, Identifying Privacy: An Introduction, 54 DEPAUL L.
REV. 657 (2005) (discussing symposium on modem applications of privacy law to
several areas based on historical development).
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tendency to regularly report on his wife's social activities. lOS
According to Prosser, events "came to a head when the newspapers
had a field day on the occasion of the wedding of a daughter, and
Warren contacted Louis
Mr. Warren became annoyed." I 06
Brandeis, his former law partner, and the two crafted a law review
article that became the foundation for privacy rights in the United
States. 107 While the urban legend of what exactly precipitated the
article has since been debunked somewhat,108 it is clear that the
authors were motivated at least in part by concern about journalism
tactics 109 that became more pronounced with the advent of the
technological changes that threatened individual solitude. IIO They
wrote:
Recent inventions and business methods call
attention to the next step which must be taken for
the protection of the person, and for securing to the
individual what Judge [Thomas] Cooley calls the
right "to be let alone." Instantaneous photographs
and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred
precincts of private and domestic life; and
numerous mechanical devices threaten to make
good the prediction that "what is whispered in the
closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops." III
Prior to the article, American courts had not affirmatively
recognized an individual right to privacy that was enforceable via
civil court,112 but had on occasion crafted legal remedies using

105.
106.
107.
108.

109.

See Prosser, supra note 103, at 383.
Id. (citing ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 70 (1946)).
Prosser, supra note 103, at 383-84.
See, e.g., James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.
L. Rev. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REv.
875,891-907 (1979); Gormley, supra note 76, at 1349-50.
Warren and Brandeis wrote:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle
and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with
industry as well as effrontery. To satisfY a prurient taste the details of
sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily
papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with
idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the
domestic circle.

110.
III.

112.

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102, at 196.
For an excellent synopsis of the historical context that provided the backdrop for
the article of Warren and Brandeis, see Gormley, supra note 76, at 1350-53.
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102, at 195 (footnote omitted). The
technological advances at issue in this excerpt from the article are not far
removed from the same types of issues facing society today.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees individuals the "right
... to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects," but these rights only
curtailed the government's ability to intrude on one's home or property; private
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eXIstmg law to safeguard such a right. 113 For example, an
aggrieved party could file a trespass action to protect his or her
privacy rights, but the plaintiff had to prove that a physical
invasion took place in order to be successful. I14 It was also
possible for parties to be prosecuted criminally for invading the
privacy of another, but such laws were often substantively
ineffective. I IS Although courts had not yet gone far enough to
positively ensure that one did indeed have the right to be left alone,
Warren and Brandeis were able to successfully mold such an
argument around a fundamental premise: creating a right to
privacy was far from legal overkill because so many other areas of
law already implicitly supported such a right. 116
The authors explained that one court had already held that the
author of any private letter, literary product, or other artistic work
"possesses such a right of property in them, that they cannot be
published without his consent, unless the purposes of justice, civil
or criminal, require the publication." 117 Another court had
precluded student publication of a teaching surgeon's lectures on
the grounds that making the material public would be a breach of
confidence that was tantamount to breach of an implied
contract. 118 Warren and Brandeis argued that while such matters
clearly deserved legal protection, to do so by stretching the areas of
contract law or trusts was not legally sound. I 19 By recognizing the

113.
114.

115.
116.

117.
118.
119.

parties were not affected. u.s. CONST. amend. IV; accord United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14(1984).
See supra notes 111-1 12 and accompanying text.
See Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and
Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 703, 705-06 (1990) (citing rYeS v. Humphrey, I
E.D. Smith 196,201-02 (N.Y. Ct. c.P. 1851».
See id. at 706.
Warren and Brandeis opined that "[t]he common law secures to each individual
the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions shall be communicated to others." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102,
at 198.
!d. at 204 n.l (quoting Sir Samuel Romilly (arg.), in Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst.
402,418 (1818) (U.K.)).
See id. at 207-08 (citing Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 3 L. J. Ch. 209 (1825) (U.K.».
Warren and Brandeis cited the nineteenth century case of Pollard v.
Photographic Co., 40 Ch. D. 345, 349-52 (1888) (U.K.), as an example of this
problem. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102, at 209. A photographer who had
taken a picture of a woman was prevented from selling it or making copies of it,
on the grounds that it was a breach of an implied term in the contract and that it
was a breach of confidence. See Pollard, 40 Ch. D. at 352-53. The court found
there had been a breach of contract, but said it was actually grounded in the area
of property, so as not to disturb existing precedent. See id. Warren and Brandeis
argued this was unsatisfactory:
So long as these circumstances happen to present a contract upon
which such a term can be engrafted by the judicial mind, or to supply
relations upon which a trust or confidence can be erected, there may
be no objection to working out the desired protection through the
doctrines of contract or of trust. But the court can hardly stop there.
The narrower doctrine may have satisfied the demands of society at a
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more general right of privacy, it would no longer be necessary to
contort existing areas of the law to create just results for wronged
parties. 120 Moreover, since the law permitted compensation for
mental distress, Warren and Brandeis contended that the private
person who chose to keep personal concerns removed from the
public eye also deserved compensation for whatever emotional
harm may emanate from having such matters exposed without his
authorization. 121 Accordingly, the pair deemed it sensible to
broaden the law in order to meet the "political, social, and
economic changes,,122 that were inevitable in a growing society. 123
Warren and Brandeis also clearly understood, however, that
such a right needed limitations, and suggested several possible
areas of privilege: (1) The right to privacy should not prohibit any
publication of any matter which is of public or general interest; 124
(2) the right to privacy should not prohibit the communication of
any matter, even if private in nature, when the publication is made
under circumstances that would make it privileged under the law of
defamation; 125 (3) any right to privacy would not likely grant
redress for invasion of privacy by oral publication if there was no
special damage;126 and (4) the right to privacy would cease upon
the publication of the facts by the individual himself, or with his
consent. 127 The authors also noted that neither the truth of the
matter nor the absence of any malice on the part of the publisher
would afford a defense to a privacy action. 128
Despite the cogency and lucidity of the article's arguments, the
right to privacy "revolution" was somewhat slow to materialize in
the courtS.129 It was not until fifteen years after the article's

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

time when the abuse to be guarded against could rarely have arisen
without violating a contract or a special confidence; but now that
modem devices afford abundant opportunities for the perpetration of
such wrongs without any participation by the injured party, the
protection granted by the law must be placed upon a broader
foundation.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102, at 209-1 I.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102, at 213-14.
See id.
Id. at 193.
See generally id.
Id. at 214.
Id. at216.
See id. at 217.
Id. at218.
Id.
For example, in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y.
1902), the New York Court of Appeals rebuffed the claim of a plaintiff who had
alleged that the defendants invaded her privacy by using her picture without her
consent in an advertisement for flour. The court justified its decision based on
concerns that:
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publication that the first American court recognized a common law
right to privacy.130 In Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. CO.,131
Paolo Pavesich, an artist, sued New England Mutual, a life
insurance company; Thomas Lumpkin, a general agent of New
England Mutual; and photographer J.Q. Adams after a picture of
Pavesich appeared in The Atlanta (Ga.) Constitution. 132 The
plaintiff s photo appeared next to a person the court described as
"ill-dressed and sickly looking."m The words, "Do it now. The
man who did." appeared above the plaintiffs photograph, while
the words, "Do it while you can. The man who didn't." appeared
above the other picture. 134 The advertisement also included text
implying that Pavesich had bought life insurance from New
England Mutual, and that his life had prospered from that
decision. 135 New England Mutual received the picture from a
negative from Adams, but while Adams knew why the photograph
would be used, Pavesich, who never had a life insurance policy
with New England Mutual, did not consent to the use of his
likeness. 136 He sued the defendants for libel and for invading his
right to privacy. 137
After the lower court sustained the demurrer of the
defendants,138 Pavesich found a receptive audience for his claims
in the Georgia Supreme Court. While acknowledging there had
been no specific right to privacy in any prior decision, the court
found that such a right did indeed exist:
The right of privacy has its foundation in the
instincts of nature. It is recognized intuitively,
The attempts to logically apply the principle will necessarily
result, not only in a vast amount of litigation, but in litigation
bordering upon the absurd, for the right to privacy, once established
as a legal doctrine, cannot be confined to the restraint of the
publication of a likeness but must necessarily embrace as well the
publication of a word-picture, a comment upon one's looks, conduct,
domestic relations or habits.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

135.

136.
137.
138.

[d. at 443. In response, the New York legislature enacted a statute that made it a
criminal misdemeanor and a possible tort action for any person, firm, or
corporation to use another's name, portrait, or picture for commercial purposes
without the consent of the subject. See 1903 N.Y. Laws 308 (codified as
amended at N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2006».
See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
[d.
[d. at 68.
[d.

/d.
Under Pavesich's picture, the text of the advertisement said: "In my healthy and
productive period of life I bought insurance in the New England Mutual Life
Insurance Co., of Boston Mass., and to-day my family is protected and I am
drawing an annual dividend on my paid-Up policies." [d. at 69.
[d.
[d.
[d.
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consciousness being the witness that can be called
to establish its existence.
Any person whose
intellect is in a normal condition recognizes at once
that as to each individual member of society there
are matters private, and there are matters public so
far as the individual is concerned. Each individual
as instinctively resents any encroachment by the
public upon his rights which are of a private nature
as he does the withdrawal of those of his rights
which are of a public nature. A right to privacy in
matters purely private is therefore derived from
natural law. 139
The Pavesich decision recognizing the plaintiff's right to privacy
produced more debate from American courts as to the legitimacy
of such a right. 140 After the American Law Institute recognized
such a right in the 1939 edition of the Restatement of Torts, 141
however, the vision of Warren and Brandeis began to establish a
permanent foothold.

C.

Clarification from Dean Prosser

While the Warren-Brandeis article made the case for
establishing a right to privacy, Prosser's article illuminated the
interests such a right protected and what conduct should be
precluded to further defend such rights. 142 Prosser's study of the
reported privacy decisions led him to conclude that the right to
privacy was not one independent tort, but actually four different
torts, each of which safeguarded a different privacy interest. 143 He
categorized them as an "[i]ntrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion
or solitude," 144 "[p]ublic disclosure of embarrassing private facts
about the plaintiff," 145 "[p ]ublicity which places the plaintiff in a
false light in the public eye,,,146 and "[a]ppropriation, for the
defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness.,,147
Prosser's work led to the categorization of privacy torts in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,148 which has been exceedingly

139.
140.
141.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

[d. at 69-70.
See Gonn1ey, supra note 76, at 1353-54.
"A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in
not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is
liable to the other." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (\939).
Prosser, supra note 103, at 389.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
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influential in helping states determine whether, and to what extent,
privacy rights should be recognized.
1.

Intrusion Upon Seclusion

Prosser described this class of privacy cases as those which
protected a plaintiffs mental interests when causes of action like
trespass and nuisance did not do so sufficiently. 149 While the early
cases focused on physical intrusions into a plaintiffs space,150 the
cases began to eventually encompass any type of prying or
intrusion into anything the plaintiff would consider private. 151
Prosser was careful to note that intrusion cases, like the other
privacy torts, were subject to limitations. 152 For example, Prosser
felt plaintiffs could not expect to recover for any perceived slight
or interference with their solitude. 153 Plaintiffs also could not state
a claim for alleged intrusions that took place in public, where the
plaintiff had no right to be left alone, or if there were disclosures
that were required to comply with existing law. 154
The Restatement (Second) of Torts followed Prosser's lead,
defining the tort as follows: "One who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another
or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person." 155 The Restatement further
stated that the intrusion could be harmful to the plaintiff s person,
"his private affairs or concerns," 156 and could be accomplished "by
the use of [a] defendant's senses, with or without mechanical
aids." 157 Today, intrusion is probably the branch that best
represents the goal of privacy torts-the protection against
"affront[ s] to individual dignity." 158
2.

False Light

Just as intruding upon one's seclusion was a possible invasion
of privacy, it was similarly clear that when a party placed the

150.

149.

Prosser, supra note 103, at 392.
See, e.g., Byfield v. Candler, 125 S.E. 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1924) (allowing a cause

151.

of action because defendant ventured into woman's stateroom on a steamship).
Prosser, supra note 103, at 390-91.

152.
153.

ld.
ld. at 390 ("It is clear, however, that there must be something in the nature of

154.

155.
156.
157.

158.

prying or intrusion, and mere noises which disturb a church congregation or bad
manners, harsh names and insulting gestures in public, have been held not to be
enough.").
ld. at 391.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
ld. at cmt. a.
Jd. at cmt. b.
Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 489 (Cal. 1998).
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plaintiff in a false light in the eye of the public, that too comprised
a viable privacy claim.159 Prosser contended that American courts
recognized three different contexts of successful false light actions:
(1) When the defendant falsely attributed an opinion or statement
to the plaintiff; 160 (2) when the defendant used the plaintiffs
likeness or picture to highli~ht books or articles that were not
connected to the plaintiff; I I or (3) the defendant used the
plaintiffs image, name or physical characteristics among images
including convicted criminals when the plaintiff was innocent of
any crime. 162 Prosser also underlined that false light claims could
also lead to defamation claims in some, but not all instances, 163
and that like intrusion cases, supersensitive parties did not merit
false light protection. 164
The Restatement presently defines false light claims thusly:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning
another that places the other before the public in a
false light is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in
which the other [person] was placed would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the
actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter
and the false light· in which the other would be
placed. 165
In order for plaintiffs to be successful, they must prove the matter
published is not true. 166
Of the four privacy torts, courts have viewed the "false light"
branch with the most cynicism. 167 Currently, only two-thirds of
the states affirmatively recognize false light as a theory of
recovery. 168 A number of states expressl~ reject it, includin~
Colorado,169 Massachusetts,170 Minnesota, I 1 North Carolina, 17
Ohio,173 South Carolina, 174 Texas,175 and Virginia. 176
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

165.
166.
167.
168.

169.
170.

Prosser, supra note 103, at 398.
Id.
Id. at 399.
!d.
ld. at 400.
!d.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
ld. at cmt. a.
See supra notes 148-155 and accompanying text.
Patricia Avidan, Comment, Protecting the Media's First Amendment Rights in
Florida: Making False Light Plaintiffi Play by Defamation Rules, 35 STETSON L.
REv. 227, 236 (2005).
Denver Publ'g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 894 (Colo. 2002).
Elm Med. Lab., Inc. v. RKO Gen. Inc., 532 N.E.2d 675,681 (Mass. 1989),
abrogated on other grounds by United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Ge1tman, 551
N.E.2d 20,23 (Mass. 1990).
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Public Disclosure of Private Facts

Although Warren and Brandeis advocated for a general right to
privacy, they appeared to be most disturbed at the increasing
proclivity of the press to make public information which most
would consider private. 177 Prosser characterized this type of
invasion as public disclosure of private facts.178 He explained that
the prior cases were consistent in that liability could only be
imposed if the facts at issue could be categorized as private and if
the disclosure was made publicly. 179 These limitations eliminated
idle gossip between individuals as actionable, as well as anything
that the plaintiff held out to the public for consumption. 180
The Restatement (Second) again followed Prosser's lead, calling
publicity claims permissible if the matter publicized is of the type
that: "a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and b)
is not of legitimate concern to the public.,,181 The disclosure cases
are designed to protect the community standing of the plaintiff and
can be construed as "an extension of defamation.,,182 Unlike
defamation, however, the truth of the facts disclosed is not a
defense to disclosure claims because a statement's falsity is not
necessary to state a claim. 183 Disclosure cases are vulnerable to
constitutional limitations, specifically those related to freedom of
the press and freedom of speech. 184
171.
172.
173.
174.

175.
176.

177.
178.
179.
180.

181.
182.
183.
184.

Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998).
Renwick v. News & ObserverPubl'g Co., 312 S.E.2d 405, 410 (N.c. 1984).
Yeager v. Local Union 20, 453 N.E.2d 666, 669-70 (Ohio 1983).
Snakenberg v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2, 5 (S.c. 1989) (recognizing
only three right to privacy torts: "(I) wrongful appropriation of personality; (2)
wrongful publicizing of private affairs; and (3) wrongful intrusion into private
affairs").
Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 577 (Tex. 1994).
WLJA-TV v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383, 395 n.5 (Va. 2002) (Virginia General
Assembly "implicitly excluded" false light claims by choosing not to codify
them).
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102, at 196.
Prosser, supra note 103, at 392.
Id. at 393-94.
/d. Prosser, however, acknowledged the tension in the cases regarding nuance,
such as whether the fact at issue was already a matter of public record when
published by the defendant. See also Cox Broad. Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491
(1975) (holding that no tort recovery is permissible for disclosure Of and publicity
given to facts that are a matter of public record).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
Prosser, supra note 103, at 398.
See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 2d 833, 841 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
See generally Prosser, supra note 103, at 394-95. If the disclosed facts at issue
are deemed newsworthy, the rights of a plaintiff who has unwittingly become a
subject of publicity can be superseded by the public's legitimate interest in that
person. Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940). The First
Amendment rights of the defendant can influence the determination of whether
the disclosure was "offensive." See, e.g., id. (holding that the plaintiff, a
reclusive former child prodigy, could not state a privacy claim against the

22

4.

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 36

Appropriation

The final category of privacy cases concerned the "exploitation
of the plaintiffs identity," i.e., using the likeness or name of the
plaintiff for the benefit of the defendant, without the plaintiffs
consent. 185 The Restatement (Second) mirrored Prosser's language
in defining appropriation, calling it viable when one "appropriates
to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another.,,186
Defendants have also been able to contest appropriation claims by
successfully arguing that the use of one's likeness is permissible
when made in the context of, or in reasonable relation to, a
publication that is both newsworthy and of legitimate public
concern. 187
Although Prosser concluded that appropriation cases also fell
under the rubric of privacy, the interest shielded by appropriation
does not on its face seem to be aimed at protecting the plaintiffs
mental tranquility in the same fashion as the other branches of this
tort. 188 Prosser acknowledged that it instead appeared to protect
the plaintiff s right to control the exploitation of his image in the
same way one protects a copyright or trademark, ~iving
appropriation claims both personal and economic texture. 18 For
this reason, this branch is often overlapped with the right to a
publicity cause of action, which celebrities periodically pursue
when someone else uses their name without their consent for
commercial purposes. 190 Still, because of the possible mental
distress that can emanate from having one's image or likeness
exposed to the public without consent, appropriation has survived
as a practical extension of one's right to be left alone. 191

185.

186.
187.

188.
189.
190.

191.

magazine that revealed he was living in a rooming house because the facts were
"newsworthy").
Prosser, supra note 103, at 401-02. The Pavesich case, which first recognized a
right to privacy, could in theory have also been characterized as an appropriation
case because of the insurance company's attempt at using the alleged testimonial
from Mr. Pavesich to generate more business. See generally Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569 (1977)
(holding that an entertainer's claim against defendant for filming his circus-like
act and broadcasting it on the evening news was not viable because of
defendant's right to broadcast matters of public concern).
See Prosser, supra note 103, at 406.
Id.
See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835-36
(6th Cir. 1983) (holding that a former entertainer's commercial identity was
potentially appropriated by defendant's use of phrase "Here's Johnny" in
association with defendant's product).
While it has survived, appropriation has not done so unscathed. One court has
called it "misleading" to attach the privacy label to appropriation claims because
the interest protected is not really private in the same sense as the tort's other
claims. Joe Dickerson & Assoc., L.L.c. v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 999-1000
(Colo. 200 I). For similar reasons, other courts have affirmatively distinguished
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Prosser's four-fold categorization of what comprised the single
tort of invasion of privacy covered the areas of physical,
informational, and proprietary privacy, described by Professor
Although Prosser's article
Allen-Castellitto and others. 19
acknowledged that more than one theory could be used under the
same set of facts, the article also concluded that it was not sound to
lump all four theories together without distinguishing them. 193
Prosser explained that while intrusion upon one's seclusion and
public disclosure of private facts both necessitated the invasion of
something confidential, this was not the case with the false light or
appropriation tortS. 194 Appropriation required something the
defendant could use to his or her own advantage, making it distinct
from the other three forms,195 and false light claims needed proof
of falsity or fiction in a way the other forms did not. 196 Each
covers a distinct mode of invasion and addresses slightly different
affronts to one's personal dignity. 197
Prosser also concluded that the right to privacy is generally a
personal one that does not extend to others unless their privacy is
invaded along with the plaintiff. 198 It is also generally not
actionable after the plaintiffs death unless expressly provided for
by statute. 199 Today, most courts limit the right to privacy to
individuals and do not grant corporations a similar right. 200 Only
two states do not currently recognize some form of the privacy
rights first espoused by Warren and Brandeis and later crystallized
by Prosser: North Dakota and Wyoming. 201
PART III
The functionality of the Internet relies on the acquisition and
accumulation of copious amounts of data. Because more and more
corporations like financial banking institutions and health care

192.

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

between cases involving the bruised egos of plaintiffs (appropriation) and suits
seeking damages for usurping the commercial value associated with the
plaintiffs' identity. See, e.g., PETA v. Berosini, 895 P.2d 1269, 1283-84 (Nev.
1995) (stating that appropriation claims involve only the "personal, injuredfeelings quality" connected to the use of the plaintiffs image or likeness).
Allen-Castellitto, supra note 84, at 13; Joann M. Wakana, Comment, The Future
of Online Privacy: A Proposal for International Legislation, 26 Loy. L.A. INT'L
& COMPo L. REV. 151, 157 (2003).
Prosser, supra note 103, at 407.
/d.
Id.
Id.
ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 260.
Prosser, supra note 103, at 408.
Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS, § I-I (2002); see Hougum v. Valley Mem'l
Homes, 1998 ND 24,574 N.W.2d 812, 816 (1998).
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organizations are keeping client records online,202 sensItive
information is more vulnerable to those with the ability,
technology, and desire to access such records without
permission. 203 This naturally creates new concerns about whether
the privacy of individuals is adequate7 protected against these
Advertising-supported
somewhat non-traditional intrusions. 20
software has already forced courts to assess the boundaries of
existing copyright and trademark laws. 205 It seems only a matter
of time before an individual, who may not have initially
understood the potential infringement of spyware programs brings
206
.
smt, too.
A.

Making the Case for the Plaintiff

On occasion, plaintiffs have been able to argue that several of
the four privacy theories-intrusion, appropriation, false liffiht, and
disclosure-were simultaneously pertinent to their claims. 2 7 This
would not be as likely to occur in suits related to spyware. For
example, a disclosure theory requires the public disclosure of facts
that would generally be considered private. 208 The applicability of
disclosure to spyware-related claims would hinge on how broadly
the court would interpret the term "public.,,209 Spyware providers
typically only offer the mechanism by which data can be
accessed. 21o There is usually no "publication" of the information
received about the user; it is collected by a third party for future
use. Still, if the collection of this information reached a significant
number of parties, a court could find that sufficient to satisfy the

202.

203.
204.
205.

206.

207.

208.
209.

210.

Gillian Flynn, Privacy in an Age of Online Record-Keeping, WORKFORCE MGMT.,
Aug. 200 I, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mOFXS/is_8_80/ai_77612539.
See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
See GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, THE LAW OF THE INTERNET §
1.07 (2d ed. 2006).
See, e.g., 1-800 CONTACTS, Inc. v. WHENU.COM, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 467
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting plaintiff injunction to prevent defendant from
delivering pop-up ads to users). But see Wells Fargo & Co. v. WHENU.COM,
Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (denying plaintiff's motion to enjoin
defendant from providing pop-up ads on plaintiff's Internet Web site).
Through August 2006, there were no reported cases where a plaintiff has alleged
a cornmon law invasion of privacy action due to spyware-related concerns.
See, e.g., Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998) (fmding
that intrusion, appropriation, and disclosure theories potentially applied to a case
where defendant's employee circulated photos of plaintiffs naked); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. d (1977).
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489, 495 (1975).
Taiwo A. Oriola, Regulating Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail in the
United States and the European Union: Challenges and Prospects, 7 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 113, 161 (2005) (quoting Perry v. United Kingdom, 39
Eur. H.R. Rep. 76, 85 (2004».
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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requirement that the fact be released to the public at large. 2l1 If,
however, the plaintiffs claim focused on the privacy infringement
created by the presence of spyware, neither the theory of public
disclosure of private facts nor the theory of painting one in a false
212
light would be actionable because of the lack ofpublication.
Appropriation claims, although a slightly better match than
disclosure and false light, are still an inexact fit. 213 Plaintiffs could
argue that information collected by spyware about their perceived
personal preferences is done for the commercial benefit of targeted
advertising, generating potential profit for the defendant, either by
using the information directly or selling it to another party.214 The
Restatement, however, clearly says the purpose of appropriation
claims is to shield an individual's interest in the exclusive use of
his
own identity.215
Accordingly,
appropriation
suits
characteristically require manipulation of the plaintiffs name or
likeness, such as publishing a person's photograph without consent
in an advertisement, as was the case in Pavesich,216 or
impersonating an individual to obtain information about another
party.217 Spyware programs only gather data to forecast user
behavior and Web tendencies. 218
This leaves intrusion as the most viable avenue for spyware
claims. Intrusion cases typically require that plaintiffs clear two
hurdles to state a claim, both of which are consistent with the

211.
212.

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See generally infra note 212 and accompanying text.
See generally supra notes 208-210 and accompanying text. If the plaintiff's
lawsuit focused on the party who provided information to a third party without
the plaintiff's knowledge, the theories of disc.losure and false light could be more
applicable. Plaintiffs would still have to show the information accessed and
distributed was private, which at least one court found to be problematic. See,
e.g., Busse v. Motorola, Inc., 813 N.E.2d 1013 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that
no privacy claim existed against defendant who transferred information of cellphone customers to research firm because information obtained was not private).
See supra notes 189-192 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 216-223
and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Dwyerv. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. a (1977).
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text. In Dwyer, the plaintiffs, as part of a
class action, sought to recover on an appropriation theory because of the
defendant's practice of renting cardholder information about their spending habits
to other merchants. 652 N.E.2d at 1356. The defendant, American Express,
successfully argued that the practice did not adversely affect the interest of
cardholders under the language of the Restatement. [d. The court found that
while each cardholder's name did possess value for the defendants, an individual
name had value only "when it is associated with one of defendants' lists.
Defendants create value by categorizing and aggregating these names.
Furthermore, defendants' practices do not deprive any of the cardholders of any
value their individual names may possess." Id. The court rejected the plaintiffs'
appropriation claim. Id.
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Restatement approach. 219 First, there must be an intentional
intrusion into what would normally be considered an area of
seclusion or privacy.220 Second, although intrusion claims seek to
protect an individual's subjective right to be left alone, courts have
used an objective standard to assess liability.22I Therefore, the
intrusion must be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 222
Predictably, there has been considerable discussion over these
fairly rudimentary requirements. 223

Plaintiffs must first have a reasonable exgectation of privacy in
the area allegedly violated by the defendant. 24 While absolute and
complete privacy is not necessary,225 there must usually be a
showing that the defendant penetrated some zone of physical or
sensory privacy surrounding the plaintiff. 226 This can entail a wide
variety of activity, encompassing physical intrusions on to one's
property,227 Esychological intrusions created by reading or copying
one's mail, 2 8 wiretaps,229 and persistent late-night phone calls.230
Without a reasonable expectation of privacy, the alleged intrusion
does not impact one's seclusion, which is why courts have
repeatedly rebuffed plaintiffs who attempt to seek recovery for
intrusion while in fairly public venues. 231 Moreover, the plaintiffs
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

226.

227.

228.
229.
230.
231.

See supra notes 215-217 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 220-221
and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Bailer v. Frye Ins. Exch., 344 Md. 515, 524-26, 687 A.2d 1375, 1380
(1997); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § § 8A, 652B (1977).
See Mo. Court of Appeals v. The Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488,504
(Mo. 1990).
See, e.g., Busse v. Motorola, Inc., 813 N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
See infra notes 224-237.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6520 (1977).
See, e.g., Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., 978 P.2d 67, 69 (Cal. 1999) (holding that
where elements of intrusion are proven, the cause of action is not defeated as a
matter of law simply because the events intruded upon were not completely and
totally private).
See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 489-90 (Cal. 1998). The
Shulman court extended privacy rights much further than many courts have,
finding that individuals do not lose all privacy rights merely by being at work.
Jd. at 490-91. This allowed an employee to state a privacy claim against a
defendant who had utilized a helmet camera and audio tape recorder to tape
conversations involving the plaintiff in his workplace without the plaintiff's
consent. Jd. at 474-77.
See, e.g., Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350 (N.c. Ct. App. 1996) (precluding
defendant's summary judgment motion on plaintiff's intrusion claim when
defendants placed video camera in plaintiff's bedroom and diverted his mail so
they could examine it).
Id. at 355.
Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 66 Md. App. 133, 165, 502 A.2d 1101,
1117 (1986).
Zeilinger v. Amalgamated Clothing, 683 So. 2d 726, 733 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
See, e.g., Muratore v. MIS Scotia Prince, 656 F. Supp. 471 (D. Me. 1987), rev'd
on other grounds, 845 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding that passenger on cruise
ship could not state privacy claim when ship's employees took photographs of
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privacy expectations must be measured in such a way so they do
not encroach upon the possible rights of the defendant. 232
Second, the intrusion must be one that is objectively
unreasonable and offensive. 233 While ultimately this is a question
of fact, courts customarily intervene in these types of claims to
determine if the alleged offensive act sufficiently states a claim. 234
No consistent litmus test exists nationwide, and courts have
differed upon how the intrusion has to offend sensibilities. 235
Courts do, however, regularly consider "the degree of intrusion,
the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion
as well as the intruder's motives, and objectives, the setting into
which he intrudes, and the expectations of those whose privacy is
invaded.,,236 The social expectations of a society also influence an
assessment of the defendant's behavior. 237
Despite the dearth of litigation over spyware, the software does
contain central characteristics that courts have seen many times
over: (1) Despite its rapidly evolving development, spyware is
really just another form of electronic surveillance; 238 and (2) it is
designed to collect information for the benefit of third-parties. 239
Both of these traits have been the subject of privacy litigation in
the past, and can therefore offer some clues as to how privacy suits
related to spyware may be received. 24o

232.
233.
234.
235.

236.
237.
238.

239.
240.

her without her consent because she was in public and not in a physical realm of
her own).
Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986,995 (2d Cir. 1973).
See infra notes 234-237 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Carter v. Innisfree Hotel, Inc., 661 So. 2d 1174, 1178 (Ala. 1995).
In Carter, the Alabama Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs properly stated a
claim for intrusion upon seclusion. Id. at 1178. The plaintiffs, a married couple,
stayed on the defendant's premises, unaware that a peephole had been drilled
behind a mirror in their room. Id. at 1177. The plaintiffs were in various states
of undress before discovering the peephole. Id. The court allowed them to state
a claim even though they could not prove that anyone had actually observed them
in the room. Id. at 1178-79. The court instead focused on the method of
potential intrusion and allowed them to state a claim. Id. Conversely, in Galella,
the former wife of President John F. Kennedy counter-claimed under an intrusion
theory against a photographer who was suing her for interference with trade, and
was granted an injunction against the photographer. 487 F.2d at 998. The
appellate court held that the injunction was too broad, and as long as the
photographer did not act in an inconspicuous manner, he had the right to take
pictures of Ms. Onassis. Id.
PETA v. Berosini, 895 P.2d 1269, 1282 (Nev. 1995).
Id. at 1281.
See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 899 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that
a spyware program was included under legislation that ensured privacy for
electronic communications).
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
For example, in Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996), the
plaintiff-husband and defendant-wife separated after five years of marriage. The
defendant made arrangements to have a surveillance camera placed in the
plaintiffs home. !d. at 352. Although the plaintiff discovered the camera and
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Plaintiffs can first point to the Restatement, which many states
follow very closely,24 for common sense support for an intrusion
claim. Section 652B, in discussing intrusion upon seclusion, says
that one's seclusion can be invaded "by the use of the defendant's
senses, with or without"mechanical aids, [or] by some other form
of investigation or examination into his private concems.,,242
Moreover, it is the intrusion itself that makes the defendant subject
to liability, making publication or any other use of the information
irrelevant. 243 Spyware can be classified as a mechanical aid used
for the purpose of monitoring one's Web habits. Defendants could
argue that there are no "senses" used with spyware, but because the
overall goal is to watch the user's habits, spyware appears to fall
within the parameters of this Restatement language.
For example, in 0 'Brien v. 0 'Brien, 244. the plaintiff-husband,
embroiled in a difficult break-up with the defendant, his wife,
moved to enjoin her from using communications she obtained from
his personal computer as evidence in their divorce proceedings. 245
When the couple began having marital problems, his wife installed
a spyware program on his computer without his knowledge. 246
The husband had engaged in private online conversations with
another woman, and the spyware program captured and recorded
all of the conversations, instant messages, and e-mails sent and
received by the user.247 The husband did not sue under an invasion
of privacy theory, but he was able to successfully enjoin his wife
from disclosing the intercepted data in their divorce proceeding, a
decision that was affirmed by the Florida District Court of
Appeal. 248 The plaintiff alleged that the e-mails and instant
messages were illegally obtained in violation of the Florida
Security of Communications Act, making them inadmissible in the
divorce. 249 Although the court focused much of its discussion on
matters of statutory interpretation, it did find the purpose of the
dismantled it, he used the invasion as the foundation of an invasion of privacy
claim. /d. at 352-55. The court found that the:
Plaintiffs forecast of the evidence shows that defendants invaded his
home, indeed, his bedroom, and placed a hidden video camera in his
room which recorded pictures of him undressing, showering, and
going to bed. . .. A jury could conclude that these invasions would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 354.
See. e.g., Nelson v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221,1223 (Me. 1977).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cm!. b (1977).
Id.
899 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. Dis!. Ct. App. 2005).
/d. at 1134.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1137.
/d. at 1134.
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Florida Act to be the protection of every person's right to be free
from
intrusion into their private conversations and
communications. 25o Because the court agreed that the spywaregenerated information was illegally obtained in violation of the
Act, 0 'Brien can be fairly read to infer that information exchanged
on the Internet is just as private as more traditional communication
mediums.

o 'Brien

provides evidence that plaintiffs should be able to
favorably compare spyware with other surveillance tools that have
been deemed to violate a r:laintiffs privacy rights. In Black v. City
& County of Honolulu, 51 the United States District Court of
Hawaii overturned a summary judgment motion and held that the
plaintiff likely stated an intrusion claim when the defendant placed
a wiretap on the plaintiffs personal pa~er in potential retaliation
for her filing a sexual harassment claim. 52 In Tompkins v. Cyr,253
a doctor stated an intrusion claim against anti-abortion activists by
showing that the defendants regularly sat on a street near the
doctor's home and watched him by using binoculars and a
camera. 254 In both cases, the defendants were unable to argue that
because there was not a physical intrusion or trespass on to the
plaintiffs property, there could be no privacy claim.255 Similarly,
spyware providers, while not physically entering the plaintiffs
domain, still may use devices that create the tortious activity. 256
The methodologies may differ, but the objective is still the samethe surveillance of the plaintiff s movements. 257
Despite the seemingly direct tie between an invasion of privacy
and the primary goal of spyware, plaintiffs are still only likely to
find viable claims in very specific contexts. First, plaintiffs would
probably need to be in their home using their own personal
computers for the best chance of recovery.258 As Warren and
Brandeis suggested 115 years ago, "[t]he common law has always
recognized a man's house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to
its own officers engaged in the execution of its commands.,,259
Courts would likely be more receptive to the theory that a plaintiff,
while in his home, using a server connection he or she believed to
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

[d. at 1135.

112 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (D. Haw. 2000).
[d. at 1053-54.

995 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
[d. at 684.

Black, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 1052-54; Tompkins, 995 F. Supp. at 684.
See, e.g., Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, L.L.C., 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1229 (N.D. Ill.
2005).
See The Forsite Group, Neutralizing the Spyware Threat (2005),
http://www.8e6.comlnewsletter/8e6/docs/wtp_r3000_neutralizing-spyware.htm.
See infra notes 263-265 and accompanying text.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102, at 220.
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be secure, out of the view of others, had a legitimate and
reasonable expectation of privacy. 260 Plaintiffs who lose access to
personal information due to spyware while on the job are likely to
have more difficulty because courts have generally held that there
is a reduced expectation of privacy in the workplace. 261
Second, plaintiffs would likely need to show they were
negatively impacted by a more aggressive spyware application like
the keystroke logger to be able to state a meritorious claim. 262
Because all intrusions are not actionable, an application that
merely monitors user activity is not as likely to be deemed "highly
offensive" by a court. 263 But applications like keystroke loggers
are easier to categorize as such because of the surreptitious manner
and conduct associated with their installation, and the generally
disreputable motives and purposes of those who install them. 264
If possible, plaintiffs should also attempt to identify both the
installer/provider of the spyware program and the party that
harvested the data, and then sue both parties simultaneously.265
This is problematic for practical reasons because like Danielle,
users often have no idea who has accessed their computer data. 266
Moreover, many spyware providers can operate from overseas
locations without difficulty, well beyond the purview of U.S.
law. 267 But ideally, a plaintiff would want to sue both installer and
provider for damage purposes. 268 Plaintiffs are typically entitled to
receive general damages from harm that stems from the wrongful
act and special damages from all harm that proximately results,269
but the dignitary harm that stems from spyware intrusions is harder
260.
261.
262.
263.

264.

265.
266.
267.

268.
269.

See, e.g., United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004); Vo v. City
of Garden Grove, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 257, 276-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717-18 (1987).
See infra notes 263-264 and accompanying text.
Jay P. Kesan, Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shirking?: A First Principles
Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FLA. L. REV. 289, 30203 (2002).
See Spyware: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 108th Congo (2004) (statement of Rep. Clifford Stearns,
Chairman, House S. Comm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection),
available
at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/ 108lHearings/04292004hearing 125 5lThe_Hon
orable_ClifCStearns.htrn.
See infra notes 269-275 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.
Dave Piscitello, Legislation Won't Stall the Spyware Juggernaut (March 16,
2005),
http://www.informationweek.comlshowArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=KSIWNVMDU
KW ACQSNDLPCKHSCJUNN2JVN?artic1eID= I 59902038&queryText=Dave+
Piscitello.
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ApPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY §
10 (2000).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 904 (1979).
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to quantify. 270 It is therefore unclear as to the extent of damages
one could receive from the mere application of spyware programs
because it is the third-party's use of infonnation harvested by the
spyware-credit card numbers, bank account infonnation, and
Social Security numbers-that results in the most serious harm.271
Since some courts have held that such infonnation is not private if
it can be obtained from public sources,272 the mere placement of
spyware may only result in nominal damages at best if all the
spyware program did was provide infonnation to a third party. 273
Without those fundamental components present in a lawsuit,
bringing individual privacy claims may, not be financially viable
for the party who is victimized by spyware because the expense of
litigation is likely to outweigh the recovery.274 Class action
lawsuits could possibly yield more success against these software
providers, but they too are far from a guarantee. 275
B.

Making the Case for the Defendant

Defendants have proven to be very resilient in intrusion cases,
and have received favorable results across the country in a variety
of contexts where privacy violations have been alleged. 276
Defendants can first contend that the Internet and World Wide
Web are both, in essence, public locales, albeit in a divergent form.
Users can engage in conversations online, play poker, and shop in
much the same way they can in any other public venue. Because
so many other people are online simultaneously, there is likely to
be support for the defendant's contention that plaintiffs cannot
realistically call the Web a place of isolation or seclusion,
regardless of where they are physically when they connect to the
Internet. 277

270.
271.

272.
273.
274.

275.

276.

277.

See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676-77 (7th Cir.
2003).
See Laurel L. Poe, Comment, The Spy Act: A Bandage for an Ever-Festering
Sore or an Efficient Safeguard for the American Consumer?, 22 T.M. COOLEY L.
REV. 329, 348-50 (2005).
See, e.g., Busse v. Motorola, Inc., 813 N.E.2d 1013, 1018 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
See id. at 1018.
See Jeff Sovem, Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation,
69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1305, 1350 (2001) (citing Missouri ex rei. Danforth v.
Independence Dodge, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 362, 370 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)).
See Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37
IND. L. REV. 65, 69 (2003); Scott Richardson, Comment, Attorney General's
Warning: Legislation May Now Be Hazardous to Tobacco Companies' Health,
28 AKRON L. REV. 291, 326 (1995).
See, e.g., Four Navy Seals v. Associated Press, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1146-47
(S.D. Cal. 2005); Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995).
See Four Navy Seals, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 1146-47.
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Additionally, a great deal of spyware is delivered when users
seek the benefits of "free" software applications that can be
downloaded without financial cost. 278 The licensing agreements
that accompany this software regularly contain language that
allows the software provider to install other applications on an
individual's computer. 279 By clicking "I acceft" or "OK," users
consent to all the terms of the agreement. 28 Plaintiffs would
therefore not be able to successfully contend that they had no
notice of the additional programs, despite the linguistic obfuscation
that frequently characterizes these licensing agreements. 281 With
such consent, defendants can argue the subsequent activity on
one's computer is no longer secluded because by assenting to the
other programs, the user has agreed to be observed, negating a
central element of intrusion. 282 Plaintiffs could conceivably argue
that the consent was invalid because they were unaware of what
they were agreeing to do, but that is unlikely to be convincing in
most cases. 283
Courts have also rejected intrusion claims where defendants
took previously collected information and subsequently sold it or
shared it with a third party. 284 In Dwyer v. American Express
CO.,285 the plaintiffs, as part of a class action, sued the defendants
for invasion of privacy under both intrusion and appropriation
theories. 286 The defendants had a business practice of renting out
lists containing its customer names and other information to other
merchants and giving the merchants data about the spending habits
of particular cardholders. 287 Since this was done without the
consent of the plaintiffs, they alleged this constituted an intrusion
upon their seclusion. 288 The court held that because cardholders
provided the information voluntarily, the plaintiffs could not
successfully argue that the intrusion was unauthorized.
"Defendants rent names and addresses after they create a list of
cardholders who have certain shopping tendencies; they are not
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

See, e.g., Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, L.L.c., 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1223-24 (N.D.
Ill. 2005).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Poe, supra note 271, at 348-50.
Most who use computers have gotten very accustomed to clicking "Next" or
"OK" in working with new software applications. Users often do so without
reading all of the language attached to the agreement. Individual carelessness
with regard to accepting these terms likely trumps any argument that parties did
not know to what they were consenting.
See supra notes 235-239 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 285-289
and accompanying text.
652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
Id. at 1353.
Id.
!d.
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disclosing financial infonnation about particular cardholders.
These lists are being used solely for the purpose of detennining
what type of advertising should be sent to whom.,,289
The majority of spyware tools are most regularly used to
detennine what type of advertisements should be sent to users. 290
Since spyware programs generally only collect data and pass it to
other parties,291 defendants could argue that any invasion of
privacy claim should fail under the logic followed in Dwyer. 292
Even if plaintiffs should clear these obstacles, the level of
intrusiveness must still reach the "highly offensive" threshold. 293
Dozens of courts have rejected plaintiffs at the summary jud,rment
stage, finding that the conduct was not "highly offensive.,,29 The
combination of any or all of these arguments provides defendants
with fonnidable ammunition in defending such claims.
In summary, one of the major obstacles to any technologybased lawsuit is the lack of complete understanding as to how the
Internet operates and how its applications are changing the way
people live, communicate, and relate to one another. 295 This
deficiency of appreciation is likely to produce cynicism in some
legal circles with regard to these types of lawsuits. Still, the author
supports the position that acknowledging such claims requires
neither overhaul nor renovation of existing tort principles. 296 With
better insight into how Internet-driven applications like spyware
can affect individual rights, it is likely that courts would more
rapidly find invasions upon individual solitude in ways that are not
in keeping with traditional paths to liability for privacy violations.
289.
290.
291.
292.

293.
294.

295.
296.

[d. at 1355.
See supra Part I(A)-(8).
See Poe, supra note 271, at 330, 346.
See supra notes 285-289 and accompanying text; see also Remsburg v.
Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1009 (N.H. 2003) (rejecting plaintiffs
intrusion claim where investigator provided address information to third party,
who later shot and killed plaintiffs daughter).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6528 (1977).
See, e.g., Plaxico v. Michael, 735 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1999) (finding that
defendant-father's act of secretly taking nude photographs of plaintiff-mother
with her lesbian lover for use at future child custody hearing did not rise to level
of gross offensiveness because of his concern for minor child).
DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 204, at § 1.07.
Delta and Matsuura argue that:
[The legal community] should strive to understand fully the facts
associated with the development of the Internet and its associated
products and services. Based on an accurate factual understanding of
today's Internet and its potential capabilities, the legal community
can effectively apply existing legal rights, obligations, and remedies
to the network in a manner consistent with the public interest yet
conductive [sic] to the Internet's ability to realize its positive
commercial, social, and political potential.
DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 204, at § 1.07.
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CONCLUSION
When Ian Fleming's legendary book series detailing the
adventures of British super-agent James Bond started being made
into movies in the 1960s, nearly every film devoted at least one
scene to the "toys" Bond might need to combat his enemies. 297
His briefcase alone came equipped with tear gas, a sniper's rifle,
and a flat-bladed throwing knife. 298 Four small leather cases could
be instantly turned into a one-man helicopter, complete with
machine guns and rocket launchers. 299 Bond's watches might
contain poison darts or plastic explosives. 30o All of these items
were typically needed to save the world on-screen, but at the time,
it is doubtful even the inventive screenwriters of those 007 films
could have foreseen today's arsenal of electronic gadgets, an
assortment varied enough to make de facto "James Bonds" out of
otherwise ordinary people. The question still remains, however, as
to whether society's increasing dependence upon technology
demands a decreased expectation of individual privacy.
To date, courts have adhered to the current four branches of
privacy torts quite faithfully. 301 This, however, has produced some
results that at minimum, seem in considerable tension with the
stated goals of this area of the law. In Busse v. Motorola, Inc., 302
for example, the plaintiffs represented a class of cellular phone
users who filed suit against several defendants for acts associated
with epidemiological studies investigating the connection between
mortality and cellular phone use. 303
Defendants Wireless
Technology Research, LLC and Cellular Telecommunications &
Internet Association funded two of the studies, which were
completed by Epidemiology Resources, Inc. (ERI).304 To create a
database, two other defendants, Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems
and Comcast Cellular Communications, provided ERI with
customers' names, street addresses, cities, states, Social Security
numbers, and cellular phone account numbers, among other
things. 305 ERI then mailed the customers a survey about their

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

302.
303.
304.
305.

See, e.g., FROM RUSSIA WITH LOVE (United Artists 1963); OCTOPUSSY (United
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James Bond Gadgets, http://members.tripod.coml-mavitins/Gadgets.html(last
visited Dec. 30, 2006).
Id.
See, e.g., Sapia v. Regency Motors of Metairie, 276 F.3d 747, 751 (5th Cir.
2002); Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 1108, 1125 (D. Or. 1998); Lake v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231,232 (Minn. 1998).
813 N.E.2d 1013 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
Id. at 1015.
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cellular phone usage and published the results. 306 The customers
had not given any permission to forward the information to ERl
and filed suit, using a number of theories. 307
The court rejected the plaintiffs' privacy claim for intrusion,
finding that Social Security numbers, names, and telephone
numbers were not "private" information standing alone. 308 The
court found that because such information could be found in public
records, and the data was neither compromising nor embarrassin~,
the defendants did not violate the privacy rights of the plaintiffs. 3 9
Such a finding undercuts the basic privac~ rights that Brandeis and
Merely providing
Warren advocated for so skillfully. 10
information for others to access in a context where it must be given
in order to receive use of the product or benefit of a service does
not necessarily mean the information should no longer be thought
of as confidential at all. Because of the rise in identity theft, most
people would consider data like Social Security numbers to be
private information, and would likely not approve of the
unauthorized sharing of such data. Busse offers a classic example
of not being able to find the ocean because of all the water, and is
illustrative of how some courts have bypassed what should be the
fundamental matter of all privacy cases-whether the release of
the information without the consent of the plaintiffs infringed on
their individual independence. 311
The Minnesota Supreme Court has described the right to
privacy as "an integral part of our humanity; one has a public
persona, exposed and active, and a private persona, guarded and
preserved. The heart of our liberty is choosing which parts of our
lives shall become public and which parts we shall hold close.,,312
Courts have already recognized privacy intrusions caused by
wiretaps, binoculars, and video cameras. 313 It therefore follows
that allowing claims based on spyware intrusions protects the vital
interests expressed by the Minnesota Supreme Court. 314
Recognizing such claims may require courts to expand the
parameters of what privacy may mean in a society with such
rapidly evolving technological capability. But it is clear that future
tools will be devised to gather information about us for myriad
purposes, ranging from selling cookware to consumers to
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

[d.
[d. at 1014-15.
[d. at 1017.
[d. at 1018.
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102.
See Busse, 813 N.E.2d at 1014-15, 1018.

Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998).
See supra notes 229, 240 & 254 and accompanying text.
Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 235.
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protecting our national security. These scientific gains, combined
with our post-September 11, 2001 interest in data collection,
represent considerable challenges to safe¥:uarding the principles
stated by the Minnesota Supreme Court. 3 5 Still, given that the
chief question in privacy claims tends to be whether the plaintiff
suffered a loss of his or her right to be left alone because of a thirdparty's activity, it makes sense that courts recognize claims against
Such lawsuits would certainly face
providers of spyware.
definitive challenges, but could be illustrative of the need to see
existing law through a different prism because we live in a
different era.
Until then, spyware will likely continue to evolve and mutate,
as programmers on both sides of the fence take turns playing
leapfrog.
Web browsers will keep developing software
applications that block spyware, while spyware programmers will
devise new methods of installation to keep their programs from
being impeded. At least for now, consumers like Danielle are
probably best served by taking precautions to ensure their own
privacy, such as installing anti-spyware programs on their personal
computers, treating free software programs with healthy
skepticism, and avoiding all unsolicited advertisements and e-mail
attachments. Although it may be a cliche, an ounce of prevention
may indeed be worth a pound of cure.
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